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ABSTRACT
Embedded systems demand on-device processing of data using
Neural Networks (NNs) while conforming to the memory, power
and computation constraints, leading to an efficiency and accu-
racy tradeoff. To bring NNs to edge devices, several optimizations
such as model compression through pruning, quantization, and off-
the-shelf architectures with efficient design have been extensively
adopted. These algorithms when deployed to real world sensitive
applications, requires to resist inference attacks to protect privacy
of users training data. However, resistance against inference attacks
is not accounted for designing NN models for IoT. In this work, we
analyse the three-dimensional privacy-accuracy-efficiency tradeoff
in NNs for IoT devices and propose Gecko training methodology
where we explicitly add resistance to private inferences as a design
objective. We optimize the inference-time memory, computation,
and power constraints of embedded devices as a criterion for de-
signing NN architecture while also preserving privacy. We choose
quantization as design choice for highly efficient and private models.
This choice is driven by the observation that compressed models
leak more information compared to baseline models while off-the-
shelf efficient architectures indicate poor efficiency and privacy
tradeoff. We show that models trained using Gecko methodology
are comparable to prior defences against black-box membership
attacks in terms of accuracy and privacy while providing efficiency.
KEYWORDS
Membership Privacy, Inference Attacks, Efficient Deep Learning,
Embedded Computing.
1 INTRODUCTION
The tremendous performance of Machine Learning, especially Deep
Learning, has resulted in their deployment to low-powered edge
devices and embedded systems. Specifically, Internet of Things (IoT)
devices extensively prefer on-device processing to reduce commu-
nication latency and overhead, while also preserving the privacy
of data from an untrusted data curator [29]. The design of efficient
Neural Networks (NNs) requires algorithm-hardware co-design
such as model compression, quantization, and designing special
architectures with higher efficiency [30]. Such NN architecture
design optimizations should conform to efficiency constraints on
memory, energy, and computation overhead on embedded devices,
and also maintain high prediction accuracy. However, such designs
often result in efficiency-accuracy trade-off [20].
Additionally, privacy laws, such as HIPAA and GDPR, require on-
device processing to maintain the privacy of user’s sensitive data
(e.g, medical records, location traces, and purchase preferences). In
this work we focus on Membership Inference Attack [26], where
given a target model and a target record, the adversary determines
if the target data record was part of the target model’s training data
by analyzing the target model’s output predictions. For instance,
wearable devices, which monitor its user’s health, commonly rely
on NNs for various health related predictions. Such devices are con-
tinuously trained on the private data of a large number of users, and
therefore, by mounting membership inference attacks on target de-
vice, an adversary can determine if the data of a target user was used
to train NNs on the target device. In such cases, it is crucial to de-
sign NNs resistant to inference attacks, where the adversary infers
unobservable, sensitive information (e.g, user’s health status) from
the observable information (e.g., model predictions). We refer to the
computations that achieve privacy through inference-resistance
as the privacy-preserving computation. Such privacy preserving
computation mechanisms affect the model’s predictive accuracy
resulting in privacy-accuracy trade-off [2, 18, 24].
Considering the trade-offs described above, the three objectives
to consider while designing NNs for embedded devices are: (a) high
prediction accuracy, (b) efficiency constraints on memory, energy,
and computation overhead, and (c) preserving privacy of on-device
data. However, designing a model to preserve privacy while sat-
isfying efficiency requirements without a significant cost of the
model’s predictive accuracy is challenging. In this paper, we ad-
dress this challenge by proposing Gecko — a two phase training
methodology for designing NNs optimized specifically for perfor-
mance, accuracy and privacy. We evaluate the privacy leakage of
three state of the art hardware software co-design techniques, i.e.,
namely, model compression, quantization and efficient off-the shelf
architectures. We show that model compression (i.e., pruning the
network) leaks more information compared to baseline (uncom-
pressed) models indicating a higher privacy risk to the user’s data
while off-the-shelf architectures (MobileNet and SqueezeNet) do
not meet all the efficiency requirements but can provide limited
privacy leakage. These observations motivate our design choice of
quantizing NNs (i.e., reducing the number of bits that represent a
number) as part of Gecko training algorithm.
In Phase-I of Gecko, the model parameters and activations are
binarized, i.e., constrained to {-1,+1} to reduce the memory, energy
consumption, and computation overhead. In addition, to ensure
computation efficiency, we replace the expensive multiply accumu-
late operations between parameter matrices and activation vectors
to simple and cheaper XNOR operations. We show that Phase-I of
Gecko optimizes the trained model for efficiency and privacy but
at the cost of a significant drop in accuracy. In Phase-II, we restore
this accuracy by transferring knowledge from larger full precision
models to the quantized models [10]. Here, the quantized XNOR
model uses the output predictions of the full precision state of the
art models as labels instead of using the true labels during training.
This significantly increases the prediction accuracy of the model
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while limiting privacy leakage. We show that aggressively quan-
tized NN architectures obtained in Phase-I ensure an efficient and
accurate privacy-preserving computation with higher resistance to
membership inference attacks.
Finally, we compare the models trained using Gecko with prior
state of the art defences against membership inference attacks,
namely, Adversarial Regularization [18] and Differential Privacy [2].
We show that our proposed models improve the trade-offs between
the efficiency, accuracy, and privacy compared to the baselines
approaches. Our work provides the first systematic evaluation of
efficiency-accuracy-privacy trade-offs to design a novel training
methodology. The code of Gecko is publicly available1.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 presents background
and Section 3 describes Gecko . Baselines and experimental setup
are described Section 4, and the evaluation of the proposed algo-
rithm and a comparative analysis with state of the art baselines
are given in Section 5. Related work are then presented Section 6
before concluding in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Embedded Deep Learning
On-device processing is an attractive alternative compared to cen-
tralized processing of data from IoT devices. Such on-device process-
ing reduces the overhead of communicating data from the devices
to the servers, lowers the privacy and security risk associated with
storing sensitive data on untrusted central server and lowers the
latency for obtaining results from processing [29].
Different efficiency requirements can be adopted to design NNs
for embedded systems. These differences make it difficult to decide
which primitive is the best fit for designing a privacy-preserving
system for a particular application. The list below presents the
most important efficiency requirements accounted by designers of
embedded systems using NNs, and privacy is not part of this list:
• Energy Efficiency. Energy consumption is a vital constraint for
low powered embedded or IoT devices which operate for long
durationwhilemaximising their battery lifetime.While executing
NNs, every Multiply Accumulate (MAC, a common step that
computes the product of two numbers and adds that product
to a register in which intermediate results are stored) requires
memory access for reading weights, inputs and intermediate
output from previous layer and one write to store the computed
output. These read-write operations consume significantly higher
energy than actually performing the MAC operation in the CPU.
Energy efficiency is achieved by reducing the memory access
by (a) optimizing hardware to exploit sparsity in MACs and (b)
reducing the precision to increase the throughput of data.
• Computation Efficiency. The total MAC operations between the
parameter matrix and input activation function quantifies the
requirement of computation efficiency. The processing rate of
MAC operations is constrained by the CPU on embedded device
which is reduced by reducing the total number of parameters.
Additionally, replacing MACs with cheaper binary arithmetic
significantly lowers the computational overhead.
1Anonymized for Submission
• Memory Efficiency. The total size of the model measured in terms
of the memory storage for model parameters and additional run-
time storage for intermediate outputs should be within the mem-
ory constraints of the embedded device. This is achieved in two
ways: (a) reducing the precision of the parameters and inter-
mediate outputs and (b) pruning the parameters by increasing
sparsity.
2.2 Privacy Threat: Membership Attacks
NNs for embedded systems do not account for privacy threats, how-
ever these threats still exist if personal and potentially sensitive data
feed the system. For instance, if the adversary learns something spe-
cific about a user’s data record used in the training dataset, we refer
to such information as privacy leakage. This privacy leakage about
a user’s record can be, for instance, the membership details of the
record in the training set of the model, referred to as membership
inference attacks. Alternatively, an adversary can learn sensitive
attributes about the user’s data record which can be used to recon-
struct the sensitive training dataset. In this work, we specifically
use membership inference attacks to quantify information leakage
in machine learning models [26].
Machine Learning algorithms learn a function 𝑓 : 𝑋 → 𝑌
mapping from the input space 𝑋 to the space of corresponding
class labels 𝑌 . This is modeled as an optimization where the ob-
jective is to find the parameters 𝜃 by minimizing the model’s loss,
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃𝐿(𝑓 (𝑥), 𝑦;𝜃 ). Machine learning models are more confident
while predicting the class of already seen train data record com-
pared to an unseen test data record. Membership inference attacks
exploit this difference in the model’s confidence to classify a new
data record as being a "Member" or "Non-Member" of the model’s
training data. This is a binary decision problem where the adver-
sary classifies the membership of a given input 𝑥 using the model’s
output prediction 𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝜃 ) to infer whether a given data record was
used in the model’s training data or not. Formally, given a user’s
data record 𝑥 ∼ 𝑃 (𝑋,𝑌 ), where 𝑃 (𝑋,𝑌 ) is the data distribution
from which the training data 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 was sampled, the adversary
estimates 𝑃 (𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛) using the model’s prediction 𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝑊 ). Em-
pirically, the adversary identifies a threshold to estimate whether
𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 which can also be learnt using a binary classifier. In
this work, we use the confidence score attack where the adver-
sary obtains 𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝑊 ) and finds the maximum posterior and infers
𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 if the maximum is greater than a threshold [22, 34]. The
attack is based on the observation that the maximal posterior of a
member data record is higher (more confident) than a non-member
data record of the training dataset.
In this threat model, we consider a blackbox setting where the
adversary is assumed to have no knowledge about the target model.
Formally, given a target model 𝑓 (), the adversary only sees the
final model prediction 𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝜃 ). The adversary does not know the
architecture of 𝑓 () and the model parameters 𝜃 . We do not consider
whitebox setting where the adversary has the access to both the
model output predictions 𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝜃 ) as well as the architecture of 𝑓 ()
and the model parameters 𝜃 . Indeed, this whitebox setting does
not necessarily result in any benefit to the adversary in terms of
attack accuracy (shown theoretically [21] and empirically [25, 28].
Consequently, blackbox setting is the more practical setting seen
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typically in Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) where the
adversary submits an input query to the trained model on the
Cloud via an API and receives the corresponding output.
3 GECKO: DESIGN OVERVIEW
In this section we detail Gecko . Gecko is a technique to construct
NNs dedicated to IoT with efficiency, accuracy and privacy as main
requirements:
• Privacy. The model should preserve the privacy of an individual’s
data record in the training set of the model against inference
attacks.
• Efficiency. The model should work with low energy, memory and
computation capacity for practical deployment to embedded and
mobile devices.
• Accuracy. The model should be highly accurate.
To fulfill these requirements, Gecko is composed of two phases.
In Phase I (Section 3.1), a first model is trained to ensure the effi-
ciency and privacy. Ensuring these requirements is however done
at the cost of the accuracy. Consequently, in Phase II (Section 3.2),
the first model trained in Phase I is then optimized for improving
the accuracy.
3.1 Phase I
We first quantize the model’s parameters and intermediate activa-
tions. We specifically binarize the values to restrict them to the
values of {+1,-1}. This operation (as seen in Section 5.2.3) results
in high resistance to inference attacks as well as satisfies the dif-
ferent efficiency requirements. The model achieves computation
efficiency by replacing the expensive matrix multiplications with
simple boolean arithmetic operations, i.e, XNOR computations. Al-
ternatively, instead of using multiplication and addition circuits in
the hardware, we leverage XNOR logic on the inputs followed by a
bitcount operation (counting the number of high bits "1" in a binary
output sequence). The equation can be represented as follows:
x ·w = 𝑁 − 2 × bitcount(xnor(x,w)) (1)
In terms of memory efficiency, binarization results in a direct
reduction of the model size as well as intermediate output memory
requirements by 32x to 64x. Lowering the precision also reduces the
number of memory access by 32x to 64x resulting in a significant
decrease in the energy consumption.
Algorithm 1 Inference Stage of Binary Neural Network with
XNOR Operations where𝑊 𝑏
𝑘
are the binarized weights (𝑊𝑘 ) and
𝑎𝑘 is the activation of the 𝑘𝑡ℎ layer
for 𝑘 = 1 to 𝐿 do
𝑊 𝑏𝑘 ← Binarize(𝑊𝑘 )
𝑎𝑘 ← 𝑁 − 2 × bitcount(xnor(abk−1,Wbk))
if 𝑘 < 𝐿 then
𝑎𝑏𝑘 ← Binarize(𝑎𝑘 )
end if
end for
The complete inference stage of the Binarized NN with XNOR
computation is given in Algorithm 1. The matrix multiplication
between the previous layer activation 𝑎𝑘−1 and the current layer’s
weights with the bitcount of XNOR operation’s output. The function
Binarize() is a deterministic thresholding function which maps the
input values to the set {-1,+1}. In addition to the above design, we
use additional optimizations for XNOR-Net to avoid a significant
loss in accuracy. It is well documented that it is difficult to converge
a binarized model during training [31] in case of incompatible
hyperparameter settings. To this extent, we use the first and last
layer of the model as full precision. These additional optimizations
have been used previously for XNOR based networks [20, 30] and
provides higher accuracy and model convergence at a small cost of
memory and energy consumption overhead.
3.2 Phase II
While we optimize for both privacy and efficiency in Phase I (at
the cost of significantly degrade the accuracy), we restore in Phase
II the accuracy close to the original full precision accuracy by us-
ing knowledge distillation [10]. Here, we consider a pre-trained
teacher model 𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 () with state of the art accuracy on the clas-
sification task and use it to guide the training of the quantized
classifier. During training of the quantized model (student), we
do not compute the loss between the true label 𝑦 and predicted
label 𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑥). We instead estimate the loss between the pre-
dicted label 𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑥) and the predicted label for the full preci-
sion teacher model 𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 (𝑥). The loss function in knowledge
distillation 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐾𝐷 (𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 ) is given as
𝑚∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑥𝑘 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 (𝑥𝑘 )) + 𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 (𝑥𝑘 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑥𝑘 )) (2)
This ensures that the student model learns to map the prediction
boundary of the teacher model and mimics the prediction behaviour
for different inputs. Therefore, the accuracy of the student model
increases compared to the original baseline of standalone training
without the teacher model.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
We carried out an extensive evaluation of Gecko. We first describe
the datasets and architectures used in this analysis (Section 4.1)
before to present the considered comparative baselines (Section 4.2)
and metrics (Section 4.3).
4.1 Datasets and Architectures
For evaluating and comparing different efficiency algorithms, we
mainly use two standard benchmarking datasets: FashionMNIST
and CIFAR10. We train the model for 75 epochs for FashionMNIST
and 100-150 epochs for CIFAR10.
FashionMNIST. This dataset consists of 60,000 training examples
and a test set of 10,000 examples. Each data record is a 28×28
grayscale image which is mapped to one of 10 classes consisting of
fashion products such as coat, sneaker, shirt, shoes. For this dataset,
we use a modified LeNet architecture with two convolution layers
followed by maxpool and dense layers: [Conv 32 (3,3), Conv 64 (3,3),
Maxpool (2,2), Dense 128, Dense 10] (Architecture 1). Additionally,
we use a fully connected model [512,512,512] (Architecture 2).
CIFAR10. This dataset is a major image classification benchmark-
ing dataset where the data records are composed of 32×32 RGB
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images where each record is mapped to one of 10 classes of com-
mon objects such as airplane, bird, cat, dog. For this dataset, we use
standard state of the art architectures: Network in Network (NiN),
AlexNet and VGGNet.
4.2 Comparative Baselines
4.2.1 NN models for embedded systems. Model designers use three
state of the art approaches for designing efficient NN models for
embedded systems: (a) Model Compression via Pruning, (b) quan-
tization of model parameters and activations and (c) designing
standard architectures (off the shelf efficient architectures).
• Model Compression (Pruning). NNs are overparameterized, i.e,
have a large number of redundant weights. Pruning the network
refers to removing these redundant weights (setting them as zero)
without a degradation of model accuracy. The pruning operation
results in a model with sparse parameters for which the hardware
designers skip the multiplication and memory storage to improve
efficiency. Sparse weights can be stored in a compressed format
in the hardware using the compressed sparse row or column
format which reduces the overall memory bandwidth [5, 6, 8].
Aggressive pruning, while compressing the model significantly,
requires to be re-trained to restore the model’s original accuracy.
For a sensitivity threshold 𝑇 , the parameters close to zero are
replaced by zero:
𝑓 (𝑊 ) =
{
0, if −𝑇 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 𝑇
𝑤, otherwise
• Off-the-Shelf Efficient Architectures. NNs can be redesigned by
changing the hyperparameters (i.e., filter size in convolution,
number of layers and their types) to reduce the number of pa-
rameters and hence, the memory footprint. One approach is to
replace larger convolution filters with multiple smaller filters
with less number of parameters but covering the same receptive
fields. For instance, one 5x5 filter can be replaced by two 3x3
filters. Alternatively, 1x1 convolutional layers reduce the number
of channels in output feature map, lowering the computation
and number of parameters. For instance, for an input activation
of dimension 1x1x64, 32 1x1 convolutional filters downsamples
the activation maps to get an output of 32 channels. Such opti-
mizations enable to design compact network architecture with
layers having lower parameters compared to the original model,
extensively adopted in MobileNet [23] and SqueezeNet [14].
• Quantization. Quantization reduces the precision of the model’s
parameters and the intermediate activations during execution.
Quantization maps parameters and activations to a fixed set of
quantization levels [13]. The number of quantized levels deter-
mines the precision of the operands (𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (#𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠)). Reducing
the precision of the parameters lowers the storage cost of the
model in memory. In addition, reducing the precision of acti-
vations lowers the computation overhead by replacing MACs
with binary arithmetic and reduces the energy consumption
by lowering the memory accesses and increasing throughput.
Aggressively quantizing the parameters and activations to bi-
nary and ternary precision significantly improves the overall
efficiency, however, at the cost of accuracy [20]. For instance,
Binarized NNs quantize the operands to {-1,+1} values [12] while
ternary NNs have values {-w, 0, w} where𝑤 can be fixed or learnt
during training [16]. These are examples of uniform quantiza-
tion. Alternatively, weight sharing maps several parameters to a
single value reducing the number of unique parameters [6]. This
mapping is done using K-Means clustering or a hashing function
where a codebookmaps different parameters to the corresponding
shared values.
4.2.2 Privacy defences. We consider two state of the art baselines:
Adversarial Regularization and Differential Privacy. These defences
have mainly focussed on improving the model’s generalization and
reduce overfitting which has been considered as the main cause for
leakage through membership inference attacks.
• Adversarial Regularization (AdvReg) [18]. Here, the problem of
defending against membership inference attack is modelled as
a minimax game between two NNs: classifier network and at-
tacker network. The two networks are trained alternatively with
conflicting objectives: first, the attacker network is trained to dis-
tinguish between the training data members and non-members
followed by training the classifier network to minimize the loss
as well as fool the attacker network. Formally, the target clas-
sifier outputs a single probability 𝐼 (𝐹 (𝑥), 𝑦) ∈ [0, 1] which in-
dicates the likelihood of 𝑥 being part of the training data. The
classifier minimizes the loss along with the output of the at-
tacker classifier balanced with a privacy risk hyperparameter 𝜆 :
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃 𝑙 (𝐹 (𝑥), 𝑦) + 𝜆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼 (𝐹 (𝑥), 𝑦)).
• Differential Privacy (DP) [2]. In this work, we specifically con-
sider DP-SGD which adds carefully crafted noise to the gradients
during backpropagation in SGD algorithm. The noise is sampled
from a Laplacian or Gaussian distribution proportional to the
model’s sensitivity which is then added to the gradients during
backpropagation. This provides provable bound on the informa-
tion leaked about an individual data record in the dataset and
ensures that the presence or absence of a data record does not
change the model’s output, hence defending against membership
inference attacks.
4.3 Metrics
Efficiency.We evaluate efficiency on memory efficiency, compu-
tation efficiency and energy efficiency. Memory efficiency is com-
pared based on the reduction in the memory footprint of the model
computed from the parameters stored in the memory. Computa-
tion efficiency is compared based on the reduction in the MAC
operations which influences the execution time. Finally, the energy
consumption is compared based on memory accesses from reading
inputs and writing results to the memory.
Privacy.We use the inference attack accuracy to estimate the suc-
cess of membership inference attack. An accuracy above random
guess 50% indicates a training data leakage through membership
inference attack. This indicates that the adversary is able to identify
the membership details of a data record with an accuracy higher
than random guess. The success of inference attack accuracy is
strongly correlated with the model’s extent of overfitting empiri-
cally measured as the difference between the train and test accuracy
(i.e., generalization error). Higher generalization error (i.e., over-
fitting) results in higher distinguishability between the test and
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train resulting in higher membership inference accuracy [26]. Ad-
ditionally, the accuracy of the model is computed using the model’s
performance on unseen test data.
5 EVALUATION
We carried out an extensive evaluation of Gecko. We first anal-
yse the three state of the art techniques for efficiency model com-
putation (Section 5.1) and privacy leakage (Section 5.2), before
summarizing the comparison (Section 5.3). We then evaluate the
proposed training methodology for Phase I (Section 5.4) and Phase
II (Section 5.5). Finally, we compare Gecko against defence schemes
(Section 5.6).
5.1 Efficiency Requirements
In this section, in the view of the memory-computation-energy
efficiency requirements, we compare the three baseline algorithms
(i.e., model compression, off-the-shelf architecture, and quantiza-
tion). Since, significant literature has compared the efficiency em-
pirically [30], we provide a qualitative analysis for the considered
baselines.
Memory Efficiency. Off the shelf models are designed to specifi-
cally reduce the memory footprint. For instance, the memory foot-
print of Squeezenet and MobileNet is 5MB and 14Mb compared
to 250Mb of Alexnet and >500Mb of VGG architectures [14, 23].
Additionally, quantization lowering the model precision from 64 or
32 bit floating point to binary precision results in a direct reduction
of 64x or 32x in the overall memory footprint of the model. How-
ever, in case of model compression the model parameters which
are pruned are simply replaced by a value of "0". Hence, storing
even the "0" parameter takes up memory and does not necessarily
decrease the overall memory footprint unless the hardware is opti-
mized to skip the storage of all the zero values in the memory. This
requires additional logic to check for zero valued parameters in a
dictionary.
ComputationEfficiency.Design of efficient off-the-shelf architec-
tures replaces the complex matrix-vector multiplications to smaller
dimensions. This reduces the overall number of parameters but it
has been shown empirically2 that this does not necessarily reduce
the number of multiply accumulate operations [3]. In case of param-
eter pruning (i.e., model compression), achieving efficiency requires
additional hardware optimization. Particularly, instead of actually
computing the multiplications with "0" pruned values, the hardware
optimization enables the user to skip the computation and replace
the output by a "0" directly. For quantized models with binarized
parameters and activations the MACs can be replaced by binary
XNOR operations, maxpool replaced by OR operation, while the
activations can be replaced by checking the sign bit and hence re-
ducing the FLOPS drastically [1]. This results in high computational
efficiency and hence, faster inference.
Energy Efficiency. Energy efficiency does not vary much with
reduction of number of parameters and data type, but the number
of memory accesses play vital role [11]. Specifically, for the case of
off-the-shelf architectures, while computation efficiency improves,
the energy efficiency is close to large scale state of the art models
2https://github.com/albanie/convnet-burden
like AlexNet [14, 30]. Alternatively, for the case of model compres-
sion, energy efficiency can be marginally improved by additionally
providing hardware optimization [6, 33]. For quantization, how-
ever, the energy efficiency is high as the memory access can be
drastically reduced by increasing the throughput of data fetched
from the memory. Specifically, lowering the precision from 32 bit
floating point to binary results in lowering the memory accesses
and 32x improvement in energy consumption [12, 20]. While some
improvements are seen natively for quantized models (from re-
placing MACs with XNOR), higher benefits can be achieved via
additional hardware optimization [32]. The benchmarking of en-
ergy consumption for different optimization and architectures is
well explored and out of scope of this work. We refer the readers
to [30] for more details.
In summary, compared to different optimization techniques, the
quantized architectures show significant benefits for different effi-
ciency requirements over the other alternatives.
5.2 Privacy Leakage
In this section, we evaluate the information leakage through mem-
bership inference attacks for the three baseline algorithms consid-
ered.
5.2.1 Model Compression. We evaluate the privacy leakage on
compressing a model by pruning the connections in the model.
Here, pruning is achieved by replacing some of the parameters
with "0" value. As described in the original paper [7, 8], pruning
is followed by retraining the model to restore the model’s original
accuracy with the pruned connections. We validate the impact
on membership privacy on model compression on four datasets
but only report results for FashionMNIST and CIFAR10 for space
reason3.
Impact of Pruning Parameters. On pruning the model, the
model’s test accuracy decreases but also lowers the membership
inference accuracy (Figure 1a). As the compression rate increases,
the generalization error decreases (owing to a decrease in both train
and test accuracy) with a decrease in membership accuracy to close
to random guess. This is expected as the parameters are responsible
for memorizing the training data information [4, 19, 27].
Impact of Retraining Pruned Model. Interestingly, on re-
training the pruned model, we observe that the membership infer-
ence accuracy is much higher than the original unpruned baseline
model (Figure 1b). This indicates that model compression in turn
increases the overall privacy leakage. This can be attributed to the
lower number of parameters forced to learn the same amount of
information stored previously in the unpruned model with larger
number of parameters. In other words, the same amount of infor-
mation is now captured by less number of parameters resulting in
higher memorization of information per parameter. As the model
is compressed (i.e., pruned), the number of parameters decreases
which results in increase in information per parameter. However,
on aggressive pruning, the train and test accuracy also decreases
resulting in a decrease in the information per parameter, which
is empirically indicated by a decrease in membership inference
accuracy from 75% of pruning.
3the two other datasets (capturing preferences of online customers and capturing
location check-ins [26]) depict similar results
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(c) Mitigating Privacy Leakage via Weight
Sharing (FashionMNIST)
Figure 1: Pruning the model lowers the membership inference leakage at the cost of accuracy. Retraining the prunedmodel to
restore accuracy results in a higher membership privacy leakage compared to uncompressed baseline model. This additional
leakage can be mitigated by weight sharing at the cost of accuracy.
In summary, model compression results in a higher membership
privacy leakage compared to the baseline uncompressed model
making it a poor candidate for applications with sensitive data.
Mitigating thePrivacyRisks inPrunedModels.Wedescribe
a potential approach to mitigate the privacy risk of the compressed
models without requiring to modify the model’s training. The post-
hoc approach utilizes the weight sharing (i.e., a class of quantization
techniques) for the compressed model. This is however, accompa-
nied by a decrease in the model’s prediction accuracy indicating a
privacy-utility trade-off. As shown Figure 1c, reducing the precision
from 32 bits to 2 bits results in a decrease in inference accuracy
from 56.57% to 52.64% for FashionMNIST. This decrease in inference
attack accuracy is caused by a decrease in generalization error due
to decrease in prediction (both train and test) accuracy of the model.
For the experiments, we use the compressed model with highest
privacy leakage (by sweeping sensitivity threshold values) to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of weight sharing on the worst case condition.
This pipeline approach of pruning followed by retraining followed
by weight sharing, not only maintains the algorithm’s objective for
efficiency but is used as a post-hoc approach to reduces the overall
inference risk [6, 7].
5.2.2 Off-the-Shelf Efficient Architectures. In this section, we eval-
uate two popular state of the art architectures, SqueezeNet and
MobileNet, trained on CIFAR10 dataset used for low powered sys-
tems. This evaluation is done only on CIFAR10 dataset as these
state of the art architectures are not adapted for the FashionMNIST
dataset. As seen in Table 1, the SqueezeNet and MobileNet models
shows lower membership inference accuracy of 53.07% and 55.57%
compared to larger models which have higher privacy leakage.
Further, the membership inference accuracy of SqueezeNet and
MobileNet can be further reduced close to random guess by increas-
ing the temperature parameter of the softmax function applied
to the output. Increasing the temperature parameter reduces the
granularity of the model’s output and is given by 𝐹𝑖 (𝑥) = 𝑒
𝑧𝑖 (𝑥 )
𝑇
/
∑
𝑗 𝑒
𝑧𝑗 (𝑥 )
𝑇 where 𝑧 (𝑥) computes output of the model before the
softmax layer. For the case of SqueezeNet, we are able to reduce the
inference accuracy to 50.93% from 53.07% while for MobileNet we
CIFAR10
Architecture Memory Train Test Inference
Footprint Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
SqueezeNet 5 MB 88.21% 81.92% 53.07%
MobileNetV2 14 MB 97.50% 87.24% 55.57%
AlexNet 240 MB 97.86% 80.34% 60.40%
VGG11 507 MB 99.13% 86.43% 58.04%
VGG16 528 MB 99.58% 88.95% 58.70%
VGG19 549 MB 99.09% 88.18% 57.85%
Table 1: Model complexity influences themembership infer-
ence leakage.
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Figure 2: The privacy leakage of off-the-shelf models is
reduced by increasing the softmax temperature (CIFAR10
dataset).
can reduce the inference accuracy to 52.62% from 55.57% as seen
in Figure 2. This reduction in membership inference accuracy is
without any cost of the prediction test accuracy of the model.
5.2.3 Quantization. In this section, we evaluate the technique of
reducing the precision of both model’s parameters and intermediate
activations. Further, we consider the extreme case of binarizing
the parameters and activations allowing to evaluate on the most
optimized case. We evaluate on FashionMNIST dataset for two
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architectures with convolutional and fully connected layers as seen
in Table 2.
FashionMNIST
Architecture Memory Train Test Inference
Accuracy Footprint Accuracy Accuracy
Architecture 1
Full 38.39 MB 100% 92.35% 57.46%
BinaryNet 1.62 MB 88.68% 86.9% 55.45%
XNOR-Net 1.62 MB 87.19% 85.68% 51.05%
Architecture 2
Full 29.83 MB 99.34% 89.88% 54.86%
BinaryNet 0.93 MB 97.61% 89.60% 54.30%
XNOR-Net 0.93 MB 92.67% 86.68% 51.74%
Table 2: Reducing the model precision decreases the infer-
ence attack but at the cost of test accuracy.
In both architectures, we see that computation on binarized
parameters and activations reduces the inference risk by a small
value. However, on replacing the MAC operations with XNOR
operations, we observe that the inference risk decreases close to
random guess, however, at the cost of prediction test accuracy. The
CIFAR10 results corresponding to the XNOR operations and its
privacy comparison with full precision counterpart is indicated in
Table 4.
In summary, we observe that quantization, specifically binariza-
tion of parameters and activation along with XNOR computation,
provides strong resistance against inference attacks compared to
model compression and off-the-shelf architectures.
5.3 Summary of Comparison
We summarize the properties satisfied by each of the approach used
for designing NN models for embedded systems in terms of privacy,
computation, memory and energy efficiency in Table 3. Here, we
mark the attributes which are satisfied with  , requires additional
hardware optimization as G# and does not satisfy the property with
a #.
Requirements Compression Quantization Off-the-shelf
Computation Efficiency G#  #
Memory Efficiency G#   
Energy Efficiency G#  #
Privacy #  G#
Table 3: Only quantization satisfies all requirements.
In order to design NNs for embedded devices, quantization (us-
ing binarization with XNOR computation) is an attractive design
choice which not only satisfies the computation, memory and en-
ergy efficiency but also provides high resistance against inference
attacks. On the other hand, model compression without any weight
sharing modifications, leaks more training data membership details
making it significantly more vulnerable to membership inference
attacks. Additionally, it requires hardware support and optimiza-
tion to achieve better efficiency. Off-the-shelf architectures, while
provide decent privacy, does not satisfy all aspects of efficiency.
Consequently, Gecko adopts quantization as a NN design to pro-
vide a good three dimensional trade-off between privacy-efficiency-
accuracy.
CIFAR10
Architecture Train Test Inference
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
NiN Full Precision 98.16% 86.16% 56.69%
Binary Precision 81.93% 78.74% 51.76%
AlexNet Full Precision 97.86% 80.34% 60.40%
Binary Precision 68.62% 66.8% 51.40%
VGG13 Full Precision 99.58% 88.95% 58.70%
Binary Precision 79.67% 74.64% 52.65%
Table 4: Reducing the precision of models lowers the mem-
bership privacy leakage at the cost of accuracy.
5.4 Evaluating Phase I
In Phase I of Gecko, we quantize the model and replace the MACs
with cheap XNOR operations. We observe (Table 4) that the in-
ference attack accuracy decreases significantly for all the three
architecture close to random guess (∼50%). Specifically, the infer-
ence accuracy decreases from 56.69% to 51.76% for NiN, 60.40% to
51.40% for AlexNet and 58.70% to 52.65% for VGGNet. However,
since Phase I only optimizes the network for privacy and efficiency,
the resultant model shows poor utility (accuracy). We observe a
significant loss in test accuracy for all the three models: around
8% accuracy drop from 86.16% to 78.74% for NiN; 14% accuracy
drop from 80.34% to 66.8% for AlexNet; 14% for VGG model from
88.95% to 74.64%. In order to restore the accuracy, we use knowl-
edge distillation as described in Phase II of the Gecko training
methodology.
The privacy provided by quantized NN is due to the decrease
in overfitting, empirically measured using the difference between
the train and test accuracy. The leakage in inference accuracy is
attributed to the higher overfitting in models as well as memoriza-
tion of the training data information in the form of the parameters,
which are specifically tuned to achieve high performance on the
train data [4, 19, 27]. This is attributed to the reduction in learning
capacity of the model on quantizing the parameters which lowers
the sensitive training data information memorized by the parame-
ters on lowering the precision. Further, the quantization acts as a
noise to strongly regularize the model [12]. At the same time, this
optimization provides high degree of efficiency to be executed on
low powered embedded devices.
5.5 Evaluating Phase II
The objective of Phase II is to enhance the accuracy of the model
trained in Phase I (i.e., quantized model with XNOR computations
which depicts high inference attack resistance and efficiency). In
Phase II, we use the teacher-student model (described in Section 3)
to train the quantized student model being guided using the output
predictions of the full precision teacher model. Here, Phase II is
heterogeneous, i.e, we are flexible to choose any full precision
teacher model which can provide high accuracy on the considered
dataset (Table 5). Here, we consider pre-trained state of the art
architectures4: DenseNet169 and ResNet50, along with the full
precision versions of NiN, Alexnet and VGGNet. The standalone
test accuracy of the DenseNet169 and ResNet50 architectures are
92.84% and 92.12% respectively with inference accuracy around
4https://github.com/huyvnphan/PyTorch_CIFAR10
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Figure 3: (a) Confidence scores are distinguishable between train and test data records in undefended models making them
vulnerable to membership inference attacks, (b) Gecko models have indistinguishable confidence scores, (c) Loss functions
in Phase I (Binarized) are higher than Phase II (Distilled Binarized) indicating the improvement in accuracy.
to 55% while the full precision accuracies for NiN, AlexNet and
VGGNet are given in Table 4.
Teacher Student Train Test Inference
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
Standalone Models
Binary NiN None 81.93% 78.74% 51.76%
Binary AlexNet None 68.62% 66.8% 51.40%
Binary VGG13 None 79.67% 74.64% 52.65%
Homogeneous Architecture Distillation
NiN Binary NiN 90.49% 83.52% 53.90%
AlexNet Binary AlexNet 76.79% 73.5% 51.85%
VGG13 Binary VGG13 89.45% 81.58% 54.98%
Heterogeneous Architecture Distillation
DenseNet169 NiN 92.84% 83.71% 54.95%
DenseNet169 AlexNet 81.87% 76.23% 53.51%
DenseNet169 VGG13 93.45% 85.8% 54.17%
ResNet50 NiN 91.74% 83.77% 54.53%
ResNet50 AlexNet 80.12% 74.92% 53.12%
ResNet50 VGG13 94.23% 86.52% 54.46%
Table 5: Phase II of Gecko improves the accuracy of the
private-efficient model from Phase I.
The first set of experiments combine the same full precision
model architectures with the quantized model versions, i.e, full pre-
cision NiN with Binarized NiN (i.e., homogeneous knowledge distil-
lation). Here, we see that there is 5% increase in test accuracy (from
78.74% reported Table 4 to 83.52%) for NiN with an increase of 2% in
inference attack. Similarly, there is an increase of 7% test accuracy
for AlexNet with a very minimal privacy leakage increase of 0.45%;
and increase of 7% test accuracy at the cost of 2% inference attack
accuracy for VGGNet. For heterogeneous knowledge distillation, i.e,
combining other architectures (DenseNet169 and ResNet50) with
the quantized models from Phase I, we see that the increase in test
accuracy is only minimally higher than the homogeneous models
for NiN and AlexNet but a significantly higher increase in the infer-
ence attack accuracy. However, in case of VGGNet, we observe an
increase of 4% additional test accuracy compared to homogeneous
knowledge distillation with a minimal decrease in the inference test
accuracy. In Phase II, increase in test accuracy is accompanied with
a small but acceptable increase in the inference attack accuracy
indicating a privacy-utility trade-off. Hence, the choice of using
homogeneous or heterogeneous knowledge distillation is specific
to the architecture and the privacy-utility requirements of the ap-
plication. Compared to the full precision counterparts, we observe
that the distilled models show an accuracy degradation of only 3%
for NiN(86.66% to 83.77%), 4% for AlexNet (80.34% to 76.23%) and
2% for VGGNet (88.95% to 86.52%).
The Gecko framework results in models which make the out-
put confidence of the train and test data records similar reducing
the inference attack accuracy (Figure 3). Further, the knowledge
distillation enables to lower the loss of the model compared to the
model trained in Phase I resulting in higher test accuracy as shown
Figure 3 (c). However, this loss function is still higher than the full
precision version indicating the test accuracy degradation of the
proposed framework and a privacy-utility trade-off.
5.6 Gecko versus Prior Defences
The privacy defences proposed in literature can be categorized into
(a) regularization based train-time defences and (b) post-training
inference time defence. Adversarial Regularization, Differential Pri-
vacy and other standard regularization techniques such as L2 and
Dropout modify the training of the neural network. Our Gecko
training framework is also part of category (a) where we modify
the training of the machine learning model in order to provide
acceptable levels of privacy and accuracy. We do not consider post-
training defences (e.g., MemGuard [15] which adds carefully crafted
noise to the target model’s output observations to ensure the mis-
classification of the adversary’s attack classifier network) in the
comparison as they can be used in addition to Gecko training
framework.
The comparison of models trained using Gecko is shown Fig-
ure 4 (FP stands for Full Privacy and reports results without protec-
tion). Models trained using Gecko are comparable in test accuracy
and resisting membership inference leakage to Adversarial Regu-
larization and Differential Privacy. The inference accuracy for NiN
is 52.90% (Gecko) compared to 54.09% (DP) and 51.92% (AdvReg)
and test accuracy of 83.52% (Gecko) compared to 85.11% (DP) and
83.66% (AdvReg). For AlexNet, the inference accuracy is 51.85%
(Gecko) compared to 52.81% (DP) and 51.83% (AdvReg) and test
accuracy of 73.5% (Gecko) compared to 79.27% (DP) and 71.02%
(AdvReg). For VGGNet, the inference accuracy is 53.17% (Gecko)
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compared to 52.90% (DP) and 53.33% (AdvReg) and test accuracy
of 85.8% (Gecko) compared to 84.91% (DP) and 85.19% (AdvReg).
In addition, our proposed models additionally provide efficiency
guarantees enabling them to be used for embedded systems.
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Figure 4:Gecko models are comparable to prior state of the
art privacy defences in terms of test accuracy and inference
accuracy while additionally ensuring efficiency.
6 RELATEDWORK
Data privacy in Machine Learning addresses different inference at-
tacks such as membership inference in a blackbox setting [22, 26] or
in the context of whitebox setting [19]. Further, generative model
have been shown to be vulnerable to membership inference at-
tacks [9] and distributed setting such as in federated learning have
also been exploited [17, 19]. These privacy leakage in machine
learning models have been mainly attributed to the memorization
of training data by the models [4, 27]. In order to mitigate against
inference attacks several defences have been explored such as Dif-
ferential Privacy [2], simple and adversarial regularization [18, 22]
which aim to generalize the model and alternatively, adding noise
to the predictions to increase error [15]. Alternatively, confiden-
tial computing aims to privately and efficiently compute machine
learning models using secure multiparty computation [1]. Inter-
estingly, post-training approaches assuming the adversary uses
shadow model attack (e.g., MemGuard [15]), can exploit Gecko by
using the models trained by this framework before to add noise.
Hardware-software co-design is crucial to accelerate the per-
formance of NNs for embedded systems. Hardware accelerators
reuse weights and intermediate computation enable significant
performance improvement [5]. Algorithmic optimizations have ex-
plored model compression through pruning [8] and reducing the
precision of the model parameters and activations to binary [12],
ternary [16] and generic quantization [13]. Binarization enables to
replacemultiplicationwith simple boolean logic improving the over-
all performance [20]. Alternatively, hardware optimizations have
enabled to design NN accelerators for low precision NNs for further
efficiency [32]. Further, specialized architectures designed for low
memory footprint have also been extensively used for low pow-
ered devices such as mobile phones and micro-controllers [14, 23].
However, all these optimization designs do not accounted for the
resistance against inference attacks. In this paper, we quantify the
privacy leakage for different optimization and design algorithms
for NNs and propose a training framework to reduce it.
7 CONCLUSIONS
On device processing of sensitive data using NNs on embedded sys-
tems requires a careful analysis of privacy, efficiency and accuracy
of the algorithms which is currently lacking in literature. In this
work, we propose a two phase Gecko training framework to design
private, efficient and accurate NNs for execution on low powered
embedded devices. We quantify the privacy leakage using member-
ship inference attacks where the adversary aims to infer whether a
given data record was used in the model’s training data. We first
provide a comprehensive privacy and efficiency analysis of state
of the art algorithms for improving efficiency: model compression
(pruning), quantization and efficient off-the-shelf architectures. We
show that model compression leaks more information compared
to the original (uncompressed) model while off-the-shelf architec-
tures do not provide the best efficiency guarantees. Based on these
observations, we use quantization as a design choice which shows
high resistance against inference attacks while satisfying all the
efficiency requirements. While Phase I of Gecko optimizes for pri-
vacy and efficiency, in Phase II, we improve the accuracy of the
resultant model using knowledge transfer from full precision mod-
els. Our extensive evaluations of state of the art architectures on
CIFAR10 dataset indicates that models trained using the proposed
framework provides high resistance against membership inference
attacks (comparable to other state of the art defences) but keeping
high efficiency.
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